Spearman's g is the name for the shared variance across a set of intercorrelating cognitive tasks. For some-but not all-theorists, g is defined as general intelligence. While g is robustly observed in Western populations, it is questionable whether g is manifested in cognitive data from other cultural groups. To test whether g is a cross-cultural phenomenon, we searched for correlation matrices or data files containing cognitive variables collected from individuals in non-Western, nonindustrialized nations. We subjected these data to exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using promax rotation and 2 modern methods of selecting the number of factors. Samples that produced more than 1 factor were then subjected to a second-order EFA using the same procedures and a Schmid-Leiman solution. Across 97 samples from 31 countries totaling 52,340 individuals, we found that a single factor emerged unambiguously from 71 samples (73.2%) and that 23 of the remaining 26 samples (88.5%) produced a single second-order factor. The first factor in the initial EFA explained an average of 45.9% of observed variable variance (SD ϭ 12.9%), which is similar to what is seen in Western samples. One sample that produced multiple second-order factors only did so with 1 method of selecting the number of factors in the initial EFA; the alternate method of selecting the number of factors produced a single higher-order factor. Factor extraction in a higher-order EFA was not possible in 2 samples. These results show that g appears in many cultures and is likely a universal phenomenon in humans.
For several decades the question of the nature of intelligence has been a matter of debate, with various scholars producing different definitions (see Sternberg & Detterman, 1986 , for a compendium of definitions). One early prominent intelligence researcher stated that "An individual is intelligent in proportion as he is able to carry out abstract thinking" (Terman, 1921, p. 128, emphasis removed) . The emphasis on abstract thought is apparent with other definitions throughout the 20th century (e.g., Freeman, 1923; Gottfredson, 1997a) . However, other experts believe that intelligence consists of more than the capacity for abstract thought, such as Porteus (1965) , who believed foresight and planning were important components of intelligence. Conversely, Cattell argued that intelligence consisted of fluid abilities-such as abstract reasoning-and crystalized abilities-such as learned knowledge of culturally relevant facts (Gustafsson & Wolff, 2015) . Yet, others expand the term "intelligence" to include the entire breadth of cognitive skills, This article was published Online First January 14, 2019. Russell T. Warne and Cassidy Burningham, Department of Behavioral Science, Utah Valley University.
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These contending definitions lead some individuals to believe that intelligence is not definable and therefore the research on the topic is inherently flawed (e.g., Singham, 1995) . Some have even used Boring's (1923, p. 35 ) circular definition that ". . . measurable intelligence is simply what the tests of intelligence test . . ." to claim that psychologists do not even know what intelligence is and that their efforts are hopelessly misguided (e.g., Richardson, 2002) .
Cross-Cultural Definitions of Intelligence
One criticism that sometimes appears in the scholarly literature is that these definitions all originate from Western cultures, which may limit experts' perspectives on the nature of intelligence (Berry & Bennett, 1992) . For example, Berry (1986) , argued that ". . . I conceive of intelligence, as presently used in psychology to be [a] culture-bound, ethnocentric, and excessively narrow construct" (p. 35, emphasis in original). In accordance with this claim, it seems that many cultures have some definition of what intelligence is and what this means to people. As a result, some theorists contend that considering other cultural perspectives would broaden theoretical perspectives beyond the traditional definitions of intelligence (e.g., .
Non-Western cultural perspectives may not be precisely equal to one another, but there are some commonalities. Many nonWestern groups value cognitive competence. For example, in India, people value intelligence and consider it an important aspect in their work and everyday life (Srivastava & Misra, 2001 ). But many non-Western cultures also believe that intelligence has a social and/or emotional component. Striving to accomplish a task is valued in India, East Africa, and elsewhere (Berry & Bennett, 1992; Jones, Rakes, & Landon, 2013; Srivastava & Misra, 2001) , while in Zimbabwe, caring for and helping one's relatives before helping friends or strangers is an important social component of intelligence (Mpofu, 2004) . Zimbabweans also value social competence, with a wider array of domains that high ability can show itself in, including lovemaking and witchcraft (Ngara & Porath, 2004) . These "noncognitive" skills may be more important for success in a rural Zimbabwean context than the skills that Westerners see as important aspects of intelligence (Serpell & JereFolotiya, 2008) . The native Cree peoples of Canada see traits like patience, deliberation, and persistence as part of cognitive competence (Berry & Bennett, 1992) . Thus, these non-Western cultures see the cognitive components of intelligence as essential, but they do not limit their conceptualizations of intelligence to cognitive skills (Sternberg, 2003) . Rather, these cultures also value emotional and social competence.
This mix of cognitive and social skills sometimes appears in the literature as "wisdom," which combines knowledge but also the ability to use that knowledge in prudent, moral, or socially useful ways. Such viewpoints have been found in Taiwan (Yang & Sternberg, 1997) , Zimbabwe (Serpell & Jere-Folotiya, 2008) , and First Nations individuals in Canada (Berry & Bennett, 1992) , and elsewhere. This has led at least one prominent Western researcher to attempt to incorporate the concept of wisdom into theorizing about intelligence (Sternberg, 2003) .
Adding to the complexity of defining intelligence across cultures is the fact that different cultures value different specific skills (Mpofu, Ntinda, & Oakland, 2012; Vernon, 1969) . For example, Berry (1966) found that Inuit examinees outperform rural Sierra Leonese individuals in spatial tasks, possibly because the Inuit environment and culture foster the development of spatial ability as a skill one needs to navigate the vast Arctic terrain. Likewise, Kathuria and Serpell (1998) found that Zambian children were largely unfamiliar with drawing with pencil and paper, thus making the draw-a-person test unsuitable for them. But Zambian children were much more experienced and adept at molding clay, an astute insight which resulted in the creation of the culturally appropriate Panga Munthu test of intelligence. This test requires a child to create a human figure using clay or plasticine. Because different cultures value different skills, some theorists have suggested that examinees from different cultures require different intelligence tests (e.g., Bernardoni, 1964; or that intelligence tests are completely inappropriate for some cultures (e.g., Kwate, 2001; Ngara & Porath, 2004; Nsamenang, 2006) and that comparing scores across cultures is nonsensical (Vernon, 1965a) .
Not Intelligence, but Spearman's g
This review of contending definitions of intelligence shows the futility of attempting to find agreement among experts-let alone among diverse cultures worldwide. Terms for "intelligence" or other cognitive abilities will often not translate directly across languages (Berry, 1966; Booth, 2002; Kathuria & Serpell, 1998) . Even if a language's word can be translated as "intelligence," it may not be realistic to expect that both words will encompass the same skills and convey the exact same nuances.
Investigating cultural beliefs about intelligence may be mildly interesting from an anthropological perspective, but it sheds little light on the nature of intelligence. One undiscussed methodological problem in many studies of cultural perspectives on intelligence is the reliance on surveys of laymen to determine what people in a given culture believe about intelligence. This methodology says little about the actual nature of intelligence. The same logic that researchers use to argue that a folk belief regarding intelligence provides evidence of the nature of intelligence could also be used to argue that widespread cultural beliefs in elves, goblins, or angels provide evidence of the existence of supernatural beings. Survey methodology regarding layman beliefs cannot substitute for collecting data on individuals' performance on mental tasks.
Additionally, the emphasis that different cultures place on various cognitive skills shows that any definition of "intelligence" will be value-laden. Western and non-Western viewpoints of intelligence are intertwined with the skills and knowledge that individuals in a culture value as being important for survival, social harmony, and/or individual success. Differing values will inevitably lead to contending definitions of intelligence, and there is no objective way to determine which values should have priority.
Because "intelligence" can never be defined in a manner that satisfies experts and laymen from many cultures, we believe that This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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individuals who wish to understand the cross-cultural nature of mental abilities should focus their attention instead on Spearman's g. For over a century (since Spearman, 1904) some psychologists have postulated that a general mental ability factor can account for approximately half of the variance shared among intercorrelating cognitive test scores (Canivez & Watkins, 2010) . This construct, rather than being verbally defined, is a statistical observation, which frees scholars from the need to find an exact definition of "intelligence." Indeed, Meehl (2006, p. 435) recognized the value of g over "intelligence," when he stated "Verbal definitions of the intelligence concept have never been adequate or commanded consensus," and that works focusing on g instead ". . . essentially solve the problem" of an inadequate definition of intelligence. From early in its history, g has had the potential for crosscultural research. Spearman (1927, pp. 164 -167) saw g as an ability that had three characteristics: (a) the "apprehension of one's own experience," (b) the "eduction of relations," and (c) the "eduction of correlates." In modern terms, these characteristics would be the ability to (a) engage in metacognition and selfreflection, (b) understand how items and concepts are related to one another, and (c) generate new ideas or concepts on the basis of existing an idea and a knowledge of a relationship. Spearman believed that individual differences would exist in such an ability and in self-reflection and the ability to comprehend relationships or use relationships to generate new ideas. Moreover, he saw these characteristics as being universal because all humans self-reflect (e.g., via memory recall of their actions) and understanding relationships-like cause and effect, or before and after. However, Spearman based his ideas entirely on theory, and did not gather any cross-cultural information to test his ideas. Later generations of researchers, however, have found that g does appear in different countries (e.g., Carroll, 1993) or used g in their cross-cultural investigations of individual differences in cognitive ability (e.g., Jensen, 1998) .
Another benefit with focusing on the g is that it is easy to measure. As long as a task is at least somewhat cognitive in nature, it will be at least a partial measure of individuals' general cognitive ability. Spearman (1927, pp. 197-198) called this idea the "indifference of the indicator." According to this theory, many different tasks can measure g, and these tasks do not need to resemble traditional intelligence test items at all (Cucina & Howardson, 2017; Hunt, 2011) . Indeed, some people have theorized that many everyday tasks in individuals' lives require at least some cognitive effort; these daily tasks may function as measures of g (Gottfredson, 1997b; Lubinski, 2004) , which would explain why so many life outcomes correlate with individuals' level of general cognitive ability (see Herrnstein & Murray, 1996; Hunt, 2011; Jensen, 1998; or Warne, 2016, for examples) . Because of the indifference of the indicator, it is reasonable to expect that g can emerge from test data regardless of an individual's cultural background-so long as the examinee understands the task and stimuli and that the task requires cognitive work or effort.
Finally, g has the benefit of being much more difficult to train than narrower cognitive abilities or some of the traits are sometimes considered part of "intelligence" throughout the world. While training for specific mental abilities (e.g., working memory capacity, executive functioning) is feasible, g seems to be much more resistant to training, at least in industrialized societies (Melby-Lervåg, Redick, & Hulme, 2016; Protzko, 2017; Schwaighofer, Fischer, & Bühner, 2015) . 1 Spearman's g is also highly heritable in Western nations (Plomin, 2001; Plomin, DeFries, Knopik, & Neiderhiser, 2016) . These two characteristics make g likely a robust phenomenon that is less susceptible to cultural differences than many other psychological traits-including traits that some may consider to be part of "intelligence."
Possible Cross-Cultural Nature of g Spearman's g originated from a British researcher working with British subjects, which justifiably could lead some individuals to be skeptical about whether g would exist in other cultures. However, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that a general cognitive ability would be part of the cognitive architecture of all human populations. First, g has been found to correlate with a wide variety of biological variables, including brain size (Pietschnig, Penke, Wicherts, Zeiler, & Voracek, 2015; Rushton & Ankney, 2009) , white matter tract integrity (Penke et al., 2012) , allele frequency (Hill et al., 2016) , pupil size (Tsukahara, Harrison, & Engle, 2016) , and myopia (Lubinski & Humphreys, 1992) . Although most of this research has been conducted on Western populations, it would be extremely surprising for g scores to correlate with these fundamentally biological variables only within a genetically European population because the basic nervous system architecture of all humans is the same (Spitz, 1978) .
A second reason why g would be expected in data from nonWestern populations comes from ethology. Researchers studying the cognitive abilities of animals have identified a general factor in cognitive data from many mammal species, including nonhuman primates (Fernandes, Woodley, & te Nijenhuis, 2014; Herndon, Moss, Rosene, & Killiany, 1997; Hopkins, Russell, & Schaeffer, 2014; Matzel & Sauce, 2017) , dogs (Arden & Adams, 2016) , and rats and mice (Anderson, 1993; Galsworthy, Paya-Cano, Monleón, & Plomin, 2002; Matzel & Sauce, 2017) . The most parsimonious explanation is that general cognitive ability evolved early in the evolutionary history of mammals, long before primates diverged from other mammalian species, and that these living mammalian species retained a general cognitive ability to the present day. Thus, a general cognitive ability would likely be a ubiquitous trait 1 It is valuable to recognize the difference between g and IQ in regards to training. The two are not synonymous; IQ is a measure of the construct of g (Haier, 2017) . Because measures of g (e.g., intelligence tests, cognitive tasks) will inevitably include tasks and abilities that are not g-such as language comprehension or explicitly taught skills, like knowledge of geometric shapes-IQ variance is made up of g and non-g components. Undoubtedly, IQ scores can be increased through training and educational programs. The Flynn Effect-where IQ scores increased worldwide throughout the 20th century-is an example of IQ score increases due to environmental changes (Flynn, 1987) . Research into the Flynn Effect indicates that IQ score increases are due to changes into the non-g sources of IQ and not g itself (Woodley, te Nijenhuis, Must, & Must, 2014; Woodley of Menie, Piffer, Peñaherrera, & Rindermann, 2016) . This also explains why Raven's progressive matrices, a heavily g-loaded test, can have a strong Flynn Effect: the non-g component is highly susceptible to training, resulting in higher scores for more recently born examinees (Armstrong et al., 2016; Armstrong & Woodley, 2014) . Likewise, compulsory education can increase a population's average IQ score (Ritchie & Tucker-Drob, 2018 ), but there is no evidence that this increase in IQ is equivalent to an increase in g. Indeed, given the breadth of schooling and the specificity of many curricula, it is likely that schooling's impact on narrow, non-g abilities outstrips its impact on g. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
in mammals-including humans from all cultures. Given the phylogenetic relationships that develop from all mammals having a common evolutionary ancestor (Hodos & Campbell, 1969) , this explanation of why g appears in many mammalian species is plausible. Alternatively, one could postulate that a general cognitive ability is a Western trait but not a universal trait among humans, but this would require an evolutionary model where this general ability evolved several times independently throughout the mammalian clade, including separately in the ancestors of Europeans after they migrated out of Africa and separated from other human groups. Such a model requires (a) a great deal of convergent evolution to occur across species occupying widely divergent environmental niches and (b) an incredibly rapid development of a general cognitive ability while the ancestors of Europeans were under extremely strong selection pressures that other humans did not experience (but other mammal species or their ancestors would have experienced at other times). We find the more parsimonious model of an evolutionary origin of the general cognitive ability in the early stages of mammalian development to be the more plausible one, and thus we believe that it is reasonable to expect a general cognitive ability to be a universal human trait.
Purpose of Study
Although we can generate plausible reasons why g would be a universal phenomenon in humans, empirical data are necessary to determine whether these theories are supported by evidence. The purpose of this study is to investigate the presence of Spearman's g in data from human populations that would be least likely to demonstrate it if g were a cultural artifact: non-Western cultures in nonindustrialized nations. As Booth (2002, p. 378 ) stated "If there are universals, they must be discovered," and for the reasons mentioned above, we think it is plausible that g may be a universal property of cognitive data in humans-whether or not a cultural group describes "intelligence" in a way similar to Western definitions. While there have been scattered reports of g in nations throughout the world (e.g., Church & Katigbak, 1987; Claeys, 1972; Guthrie, 1963; Miron, 1975; Proctor, Kranzler, Rosenbloom, Martinez, & Guevara-Aguire, 2000; Rothhammer & Llop, 1976; Vernon, 1961 Vernon, , 1965b , in this study we aim to systematically compile as many data sets as possible from non-Western populations in developing nations and determine whether each one produces a general cognitive ability factor using a uniform factor analysis methodology. In this way we hope to put g theory to a strongly falsifiable empirical test and to test whether g theory has limits in its applicability across human cultures.
In addition to being a robust test of theory, we also view our work as a replication in three forms. The first is that we generally followed Carroll's (1993) procedures in his landmark report of his factor analysis procedures of 477 data sets from 19 countries, though with some updates to modernize the methodology (see below). The second form that our work is a replication is that we reanalyzed previously published data, which is ". . . a form of replication-a procedure recognized as critical in all scientific investigation" (Carroll, 1993, p. 80) . This is because subjecting the same data to a different, improved methodological procedure is a test of whether the original results are robust. Finally, our study may also be considered a replication because it applied the same methodology to many independent data sets in order to determine whether the results are similar. Given the crisis of confidence in the replicability of many published psychological studies (Camerer et al., 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015) , our three-pronged replication of prior research on the structure of cognitive abilities is a valuable endeavor.
Method

Search Procedure
Before beginning our search for data we defined a priori the populations that would qualify for the study. We defined "nonWestern" nations as countries with fewer than 50% of their population classified as White or European, based on statistics from the World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). We defined "nonindustrialized" nations as countries that the United Nations (2018) had ever labeled as a "least developed country" or which were currently labeled "low middle income countries." The final list of 81 nations that were both non-Western and nonindustrialized are listed in Table 1 and shown on the map in Figure 1 .
After we identified the qualifying countries, we preregistered our search and analysis procedures through aspredicted.org (see https://osf.io/tgq5y/ for preregistration information). Following our preregistration protocol, we searched for the terms (cognitive OR intelligence) AND name of country in PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, ScienceDirect, JSTOR, AnthroSource, Web of Science, and a multidatabase search of our institution's library. We also searched for samples by investigating the reference lists of Carroll's (1993) For inclusion in our study, data sets must contain scores from at least four cognitive tasks or tests. Sample members were also required to be predominantly or entirely nonclinical individuals, and samples that consisted of individuals who were selected on the basis of a disability, physical disease, or psychological diagnosis were not included. The raw data or a correlation matrix and sample size were also required for inclusion in the study.
Analysis
After our search, we performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on each correlation matrix or dataset found using principal axis extraction and promax rotation. We chose this nonorthogonal rotation method because an orthogonal rotation method would require cognitive abilities to be perfectly uncorrelated, which we thought was unrealistic because scores on mental tasks are frequently positively correlated-a finding which has been apparent in psychological research for many years (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Jensen, 1998; Spearman, 1904; Yerkes, 1921) .
One of the most important-and yet most subjective-decisions in an EFA is the method for retaining the number of factors. We used two methods for making this decision: (a) Larsen and Warne's (2010) modification of the Guttman rule of factor selection, and (b) Velicer's (1976) minimum average partial (MAP) method. The former rule retains a factor in a dataset if the entire 95% confidence interval around the factor's eigenvalue is greater This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. than 1.0 -an attempt to compensate for the tendency for the Guttman rule to frequently identify many more factors than a dataset really contains. The MAP method identifies the number of factors to retain in the dataset by finding the factor at which the average of the squared partial correlations is at its smallest value after first partialing out the extracted factor(s) (Velicer, 1976) . We used SPSS syntax from O'Connor (2000) to execute the MAP method. Prior research on methods for selecting the number of factors in an EFA indicates that the MAP method is generally the most accurate and that all other methods-including the modified Guttman rule-select too many factors (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999; Hakstian, Rogers, & Cattell, 1982; van der Eijk & Rose, 2015; Velicer, Eaton, & Fava, 2000; Warne & Larsen, 2014; Zwick & Velicer, 1982 , 1986 . Still, no selection method is always accurate, so the best practice is to use multiple methods of selecting the number of factors in a dataset (Thompson, 2004) . When more than one factor was obtained in either method, the factor scores were subjected to a second-order EFA to determine whether the factor scores produced a general factor in order to follow the procedure established by Carroll (1993) in his similar reanalysis of cognitive data sets. This second-order EFA also used principal axis extraction and promax rotation and the same two methods for selecting the number of factors, along with a SchmidLeiman solution to interpret the results (Schmid & Leiman, 1957; Wolff & Preising, 2005) . We performed this second-order factor analysis because identifying multiple factors in a dataset is not sufficient evidence against g because factors may themselves be correlated strongly enough that their relationships may be explained by a higher-order g factor. Thus, in cases where multiple factors were present, a second-order EFA was necessary to test whether the multiple factors still were components of g or whether they were sufficiently separate for us to reach the conclusion that g was absent from the dataset. For all factor analyses, the percentage of variance explained by the first unrotated factor (another definition of g) was also recorded. We decided that a sample would be labeled as producing g if either (a) the initial EFA produced just one factor, or (b) the second-order EFA produced a single factor.
In our preregistration protocol, we specified that we would attempt an exploratory investigation of data sets that did not produce g in order to ascertain why g was not present. We believe that perhaps there could be a common characteristic of these data sets (e.g., from the same part of the world, same age group, a broader definition of cognitive variables). As will be apparent in the Results section, this exploratory investigation was not needed.
Deviations From Preregistration Protocols and Ad Hoc Decisions
For the sake of transparency, we find it important to explicitly state deviations from our preregistration protocol. First, in our preregistration, we stated that we would search for (cognitive OR intelligence) AND the name of a continent or population. However, searching for a continent was not feasible in finding data sets. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
We also had difficulty generating a list of population groups (e.g., ethnic groups, tribal groups) that would be useful for our search procedures.
Although not part of our preregistration, we expanded our search procedures by examining the reference lists of every article that contained usable data for our study and of five articles about intelligence levels in developing nations (Lynn, 2010; Rindermann, 2013; Wicherts, Dolan, Carlson, & van der Maas, 2010a , 2010b Wicherts, Dolan, & van der Maas, 2010 ) and Lynn's (2015) compilation of worldwide IQ test results. We also found that searching for specific intelligence test names, coupled with the terms "cognitive" or "intelligence" and a country name (e.g., Wechsler intelligence Ghana) in Google Scholar was productive. We also examined the entire archives of four journals that specialize in differential psychology and intelligence research (Intelligence, Personality and Individual Differences, the Journal of Intelligence, and Mankind Quarterly) to search for samples from the countries in Table 1 . Finally, we contacted via e-mail two groups of researchers whom we believed would have access to relevant data. The first was leading researchers in the field of cross-cultural cognitive testing or testing in developing nations. The second group consisted of corresponding authors of articles in which it was clear that the data we desired had been collected but not reported as a correlation matrix. The list of authors who responded by sharing their raw data or an appropriate matrix is in our acknowledgments.
Another deviation from the preregistration protocol was in the decision method for the number of factors in a dataset. This is one of the most important decisions in an EFA (Thompson, 2004; Warne & Larsen, 2014) , and these decisions can make g artificially easier or harder to identify. In addition to the two methods we used, we also originally intended to use parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) , which simulation studies have shown is one of the more accurate methods of identifying the number of factors in a dataset (e.g., Warne & Larsen, 2014; Zwick & Velicer, 1986) , which was one of the factor selection procedures Carroll (1993) used. We intended to use the computer syntax from O'Connor (2000) to conduct parallel analysis. However, we discovered that when applied to correlation matrices (instead of raw data), parallel analysis greatly overfactored and produced results that were not realistic. (The results indicated that every dataset contained more factors than would be suggested even by the original Guttman rule, which is known to regularly overfactor.) This overfactoring was because parallel analysis randomly shuffles variable scores within a dataset to produce a new dataset of random data with the same mean and standard deviation for all variables. Eigenvalues for this new dataset are compared with the original dataset's eigenvalues, and all factors with eigenvalues in the original dataset that exceed the random data's corresponding factors' eigenvalues are retained (Thompson, 2004) . However, in a correlation matrix, the raw scores are unavailable to perform an accurate parallel analysis. Therefore, we eliminated the use of parallel analysis in determining the number of factors in the data sets.
As we found data sets, some unforeseen situations developed that required ad hoc decisions. For several data sets, authors used pairwise deletion to handle missing data, which resulted in an inconsistent sample size within a correlation matrix. Most authors (e.g., Berry et al., 1986; Humble & Dixon, 2017) reported the maximum sample size, and we used the sample size for our analyses. Another frequent situation arose when deciding which variables in a correlation matrix were "cognitive" variables. We decided that demographic variables-including educational attainment level-were not cognitive, nor were personality variables or measures of opinions or attitudes. These variables were excluded from analyses. In ambiguous situations we contacted the corresponding author to ask whether they considered a variable to be "cognitive" in nature. When this was not possible or feasible, we erred on the side of caution and included a variable because we Table 1 . The darker gray countries are represented in the study, while the lighter gray nations were included in the search but did not produce any data. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
wanted to maximize the chances of rejecting g and finding more than one general cognitive factor. This was our strategy because we wanted to subject g theory to the strongest falsification test possible. We also decided that for inclusion in the study, a variable must be a measure of sample members' mental abilities, and not a rating from an informant, such as a peer, parent, or teacher (e.g., )-unless the rating was the result of a direct observation of the individual. Additionally, we occasionally found a dataset where examinees were given cognitive measures at multiple times, such as at various points in a longitudinal study or before and after an intervention (e.g., Bangirana, Sikorskii, Giordani, Nakasujja, & Boivin, 2015; Sternberg et al., 2002) . In these situations, we chose to use data from the earliest measurement occasion possible. Finally, some samples consisted of data from multiple countries; usually all of the countries were on the list in Table 1 , but one dataset (Gauvain & Munroe, 2009 ) included data from Belize and American Samoa. We made an ad hoc decision that this sample qualified for our study because the Belizean individuals were from an Afro-Caribbean community that spoke a native language and that Belize was impoverished enough when the data were collected (the late 1970s) to have been included on our list of nations in Table 1 . The American Samoan sample would have been too economically prosperous for inclusion in our study had its data been reported alone, but these individuals were only 25% of sample members.
Most data that we found in our search was in the form of correlation matrices. However, raw data were available occasionally-a situation we had not anticipated. When possible we used multiple imputation with 20 imputations to handle missing data. For two data sets (Condon & Revelle, 2016) , this produced unrealistic answers (four nearly uncorrelated factors produced from four observed variables after imputation, but the observed variables were moderately correlated using listwise deletion), probably because the variables were average scores of items that examinees had received in an item sampling procedure. For these two data sets we used listwise deletion to handle missing data. The same data source also produced data sets from other countries listed in Table 1 . We chose to include data from Condon and Revelle (2016) only if there were 150 individuals from the same nation after listwise deletion procedures. This sample size was chosen a priori based on a recommendation from Thompson (2004, p. 24) regarding minimum sample sizes for EFA.
Finally, in seven studies Bhatia, 1955; Gichuhi, 1999; Lean & Clements, 1981; Mahmood, 2013; Sternberg et al., 2001; Veena, 2014) , there were two correlation matrices presented, and the "correct" matrix to analyze was not clear. For example, this could happen if one matrix had a variable partialed out (e.g., age) or if two matrices included a different set of variables. For these studies, we chose to analyze both matrices and present both sets of results. Six pairs of matrices produced the same number of factors and very similar percentages of variance in the first identified factor, while the seventh (Gichuhi, 1999) produced a slightly different number of factors, though the strength of the first factor was almost exactly the same.
Results
Our search produced 99 samples from 31 countries with a total of 52,839 individuals. Two data sets were found to report data from the same examinees Sternberg et al., 2001 ). This information was not explicitly stated in either article, but the sample and community description makes it clear that the participants of these studies are the same people, though the sample sizes differ slightly (ns ϭ 85 and 86). However, this redundancy did not produce any analysis problems because the correlation matrix in the Grigorenko et al. (2001) article was not positive definite. Because this matrix was not analyzable we eliminated it from further consideration. Another correlation matrix (Brimble, 1963) was not positive definite, and so we also eliminated it from further analysis. Elimination of these two data sets resulted in an aggregate total of 97 samples from 31 countries totaling 52,340 individuals. The countries that the samples originated from are marked in bold on Table 1 and shown in dark gray in Figure 1 .
The mean sample size of the remaining data sets was 539.6 (SD ϭ 1,574.5). The large standard deviation in relationship to the mean is indicative of the noticeably positively skewed distribution of sample sizes, a finding supported by the much smaller median of 170 and skewness value of 6.297. There were 16,559 females (33.1%), 25,431 males (48.6%), and 10,350 individuals whose gender was unreported (19.8%). The majority of samples-62 of 97 samples (63.9%)-consisted entirely or predominantly of individuals below 18. Most of the remaining samples contained entirely or predominantly adults (32 data sets, 33.0%), and the remaining 3 datasets (3.1%) had an unknown age range or an unknown mix of adults and children). The samples span nearly the entire range of life span development, from age 2 to elderly individuals. Table 2 contains a description of the data sets we found in our literature search. Thirty countries from Table 1 are represented in the data sets, plus Belize and the territory of American Samoa. The data sets come from every inhabited continent and region of the world, except Europe (eliminated in advance because of its Western cultures) and Australia (eliminated because of its economic prosperity and Western population and culture). Table 3 displays the number of factors that were identified in each dataset when using the modified Guttman procedure and MAP. There were 75 (77.3%) data sets that were found to have one factor (presumably g) when using the modified Guttman procedure to determine the number of factors, and 82 (84.5%) data sets had one factor when using MAP. A total of 71 data sets (73.2%) had only one factor identified via both methods, meaning that 26 data sets had multiple factors when using either MAP or the modified Guttman procedure (26.8%).
2
Among the 26 data sets that produced multiple factors with either the modified Guttman rule or MAP, almost all of them produced one second-order factor, which would presumably represent g. Only one dataset produced more than one second-order factor (Grigorenko, Ngorosho, Jukes, & Bundy, 2006) . This dataset produced two first-order factors when using MAP and three 2 The website https://osf.io/tgq5y/ includes of repository of our data analysis syntax files so that readers can verify our results. These files are annotated for the reader's convenience. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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first-order factors when using the modified Guttman rule. When the modified Guttman rule's three factors are analyzed using a second-order EFA, two factors emerged. However, when MAP's two factors are analyzed using a second-order EFA, only one factor emerged. Thus, even this dataset cannot consistently produce multiple higher-order factors. Table 3 also displays the percentage of variance accounted for by the first extracted factor in the initial EFA of each dataset. The average first factor explained 45.9% of variance (SD ϭ 12.9%), with a median of 44.4%. The weakest first factor accounted for 18.3% of variance (Attallah, Ahmed, & Meisenberg, 2014) , while the strongest first factor accounted for 86.3% of observed variable variance (Rehna & Hanif, 2017) .
Thirty-one second-order EFAs of 26 data sets were attempted after more than one first-order factor was obtained. Five data sets (Dasen, 1984; Grigorenko et al., 2006; Guthrie, 1963; Hashmi, Tirmizi, & Shah, 2010; MacArthur, Irvine, & Brimble, 1964) were given multiple second-order EFAs because there were differing numbers of first-order factors retained when using the modified Guttman and MAP rules. Of these 31 second-order EFAs, factor extraction was not possible in three of them (both Gurven et al., 2017 , samples and the three-factor solution for Hashmi et al., 2010) , and-as already stated-one produced two second-order factors (Grigorenko et al., 2006 , three first-order factor solutions). Of the remaining second-order EFAs, a general factor accounted for an average 44.9% of extracted variance (SD ϭ 19.1%).
Discussion
General Discussion of Results
We conducted this study to create a strong test of the theory that general cognitive ability is a cross-cultural trait by searching for g in human populations where g would be the least likely to be present or would be weakest. The results of this study are remarkably similar to results of EFA studies of Western samples, which show that g accounts for approximately half of the variance among a set of cognitive variables (e.g., Canivez & Watkins, 2010) . In our study, the first extracted factor in 97 EFAs of data sets from non-Western, nonindustrialized countries was 45.9%.
Moreover, 73.2% of the data sets unambiguously produced a single factor, regardless of the method used to select the number of factors in the EFA. Of the remaining data sets, almost every one in which a second-order EFA was possible produced a single general factor. The only exceptions were from Grigorenko, Ngorosho, Jukes, and Bundy (2006) and Gurven et al. (2017) . The Grigorenko et al. (2006) dataset produced two general factors only if one sees the modified Guttman method of selecting the number of firstorder factors as being a more realistic solution than MAP. Given the modified Guttman rule's penchant for overfactoring and the generally accurate results from MAP in simulation studies (Warne & Larsen, 2014) , it seems more likely that even the Grigorenko et al. (2006) dataset has two first-order factors and one general factor that accounts for 49.9% of extracted variance. The Gurven et al. (2017) samples both produced two factors in an initial EFA, but the factor extraction process failed for the second-order EFAs for both samples. The inability to test whether the two initial factors could form a general factor makes the Gurven et al. (2017) data ambiguous in regards to the evidence of the presence of g in its Bolivian samples.
Although we did not preregister any exact predictions for our study, we are astonished at the uniformity of these results. We expected before this study began that many samples would produce g, but that there would have been enough samples for us to conduct a post hoc exploratory analysis to investigate why some samples were more likely to produce g than others. With only three samples that did not produce g, we were unable to undertake our plans for exploratory results because g appeared too consistently in the data.
Thus, Spearman's g appeared in at least 94 of the 97 data sets (97.0%) from 31 countries that we investigated, and the remaining three samples produced ambiguous results. Because these data sets originated in cultures and countries where g would be least likely to appear if it were a cultural artifact, we conclude that general cognitive ability is likely a universal human trait. The characteristics of the original studies that reported these data support this Bhatia (1955, p. 50) presents an alternate correlation matrix that has age partialled out. The results indicate one factor (regardless of factor number selection method) that explains 44.511% of observed variable variance.
c Gichuhi (1999, p. 32 ) also reported a correlation matrix based on standardized WISC-III subtest scores that were transformed using Fisher's z transformation and the American WISC-III standardization data. The results indicate one factor (regardless of factor number selection method) that explains 46.133% of observed variable variance.
d Lean and Clements (1981, p. 290 ) also reported an alternative correlation matrix which included two tests of mathematics and combined the two spatial ability test scores. The results indicate one factor (regardless of factor number selection method) that explains 33.030% of observed variable variance.
e Mahmood (2013, p. 99 ) also includes the correlation between subtest scores and college grades. The results indicate one factor (regardless of factor number selection method) that explains 40.941% of observed variable variance.
f Sternberg et al. (2001, p. 412 ) also reported an alternate correlation matrix with age and socioeconomic status partialled out. The results indicate one factor (regardless of factor number selection method) that explains 43.715% of observed variable variance.
g Veena (2014, p. 56 ) also reported a correlation matrix of the same variables measured when the same subjects were in adolescents (age 13-14). The results indicate one factor (regardless of factor number selection method) that explains 41.746% of observed variable variance. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
conclusion. For example, some of these data sets were collected by individuals who are skeptical of the existence or primacy of g in general or in non-Western cultures (e.g., Hashmi et al., 2010; Hashmi, Tirmizi, Shah, & Khan, 2011; O'Donnell et al., 2012; Pitchford & Outhwaite, 2016; Stemler et al., 2009; Sternberg et al., 2001 Sternberg et al., , 2002 . One would think that these investigators would be most likely to include variables in their data sets that would form an additional factor. Yet, with only three ambiguous exceptions (Grigorenko et al., 2006; Gurven et al., 2017) , these researchers' data still produced g. Additionally, many of these data sets were collected with no intention of searching for g (e.g., Bangirana et al., 2015; Berry et al., 1986; Engle, Klein, Kagan, & Yarbrough, 1977; Kagan et al., 1979; McCoy, Zuilkowski, Yoshikawa, & Fink, 2017; Mourgues et al., 2016; Ord, 1970; Rehna & Hanif, 2017; Reyes et al., 2010; Tan, Reich, Hart, Thuma, & Grigorenko, 2014) . And yet a general factor still developed anyway. It is important to recognize, though, that the g factor explained more observed variable variance in some samples than in others.
For those who wish to equate g with a Western view of "intelligence," this study presents several problems for the argument that Western views of intelligence are too narrow. First, in our search, we discovered many examples of nonWestern psychologists using Western intelligence tests with little adaptation and without expressing concern about the tests' overly narrow measurement techniques. Theorists who argue that the Western perspective of intelligence is too culturally narrow must explain why these authors use Western (or Western-style) intelligence tests and why these tests have found widespread acceptance in the countries we investigated (Oakland, Douglas, & Kane, 2016) . Another difficulty for the argument that Western views of intelligence are too narrow is the fact that tests developed in these nonindustrialized, nonWestern cultures positively correlate with Western intelligence tests (Mahmood, 2013; van den Briel et al., 2000) . This implies that these indigenous instruments are also g-loaded to some extent, which would support Spearman's (1927) belief in the indifference of the indicator.
One final issue bears mention. Two peer reviewers raised the possibility that developmental differences across age groups could be a confounding variable because a g factor may be weaker in children than adults. To investigate this possibility, we conducted two post hoc nonpreregistered analyses. First, we found the correlation between the age of the sample (either its mean or the midpoint of the sample's age range) and the variance explained by the first factor in the dataset was r ϭ .127 (r 2 ϭ .016, n ϭ 84, p ϭ .256). Because a more discrete developmental change in the presence of strength of a g factor was plausible, we also divided the data sets five age groups: Ͻ7 years (10 samples), 7-12.99 years (34 samples), 13-17.99 years (12 samples), 18 -40.99 years (21 samples), and Ն41 years (five samples). All of these age groups had a mean first factor that had a similar strength (between 41.79% and 49.63%), and the null hypothesis that all age groups had statistically equal means could not be rejected (p ϭ .654, 2 ϭ .031) These analyses indicate that there was no statistical relationship between sample age and the strength of the g factor in a dataset.
Methodological Discussion
A skeptic of g could postulate that our results are a statistical artifact of the decisions we used to conduct a factor analysis. Some data sets in our study had been subjected to EFA in the past, and the results often differed from ours (Attallah et al., 2014; Bulatao & Reyes-Juan, 1968; Church, Katigbak, & Almario-Velazco, 1985; Conant et al., 1999; Dasen, 1984; Dawson, 1967b; Elwan, 1996; Guthrie, 1963; Humble & Dixon, 2017; Irvine, 1964; Kearney, 1966; Lean & Clements, 1981; McFie, 1961; Miezah, 2015; Orbell, 1981; Rasheed et al., 2017; Ruffieux et al., 2010; Sen, Jensen, Sen, & Arora, 1983; Sukhatunga et al., 2002; van en Briel et al., 2000; Warburton, 1951) . In response, we wish to emphasize that we chose procedures a priori that are modern methods accepted among experts in factor analysis (e.g., Fabrigar et al., 1999; Larsen & Warne, 2010; Thompson, 2004; Warne & Larsen, 2014) . The use of promax rotation, for example, might be seen as an attempt to favor correlated first-order factors-which are mathematically much more likely to produce a second-order g than orthogonal factors. However, promax rotation does not force factors to be correlated, and indeed uncorrelated factors are possible after a promax rotation. Therefore, the use of promax rotation permitted a variety of potential factor solutions-including uncorrelated factors-and permitted the strong test of g theory that we desired.
Another potential source of criticism would be our methods of retaining the number of factors in a dataset. The original Guttman (1954) rule of retaining all factors with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or greater is the most common method used in the social sciences, probably because it is the default method on many popular statistical analysis packages (Fabrigar et al., 1999) . However, the method can greatly overfactor, especially when a dataset has a large number of variables, the sample size is large, and when factor loadings are weak (Warne & Larsen, 2014) . These circumstances are commonly found in cognitive data sets, which are frequently plagued by overfactoring (Frazier & Youngstrom, 2007) . This is why we chose to use more conservative and accurate methods of retaining the number of factors (Warne & Larsen, 2014) . The use of MAP is especially justified by its strong performance in simulation studies and its tendency to rarely overfactor. MAP is insensitive to sample size, the correlation among observed variables, factor loading strength, and the number of observed variables (Warne & Larsen, 2014) , all of which varied greatly among the 97 analyzable data sets.
Indeed, it is because of our use of modern methods of factor selection and rotation that we believe that prior researchers have never noticed g as a ubiquitous property of cognitive data in non-Western groups. Many prior researchers used varimax rotation and the original Guttman rule, likely because these methods mathematically and computationally were easier in the days before inexpensive personal computers or because both are the default method in popular statistics packages today. (Additionally, the older data sets predate the invention of promax rotation and/or MAP). But both of these methods obscure the presence of g. As an extreme example, Guthrie's (1963) data consist of 50 observed variables (the most of any dataset in our study) that produced 22 factors when he subjected them to these procedures. Some of Guthrie's (1963) factors were weak, uninterpretable, or defined by just one or two variables. In our analyses we found five (using This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
MAP) or 10 (using the modified Guttman rule) first-order factors; when subjected to the second-order EFA, the data clearly produced a single factor with an obvious interpretation: g. The results of this study are highly unlikely to be a measurement artifact because the original researchers used a wide variety of instruments to measure cognitive skills in examinees. While some of these instruments were adaptations of Western intelligence tests (e.g., Abdelhamid, Gómez-Benito, Abdeltawwab, Bakr, & Kazem, 2017), some samples included variables that were based on Piagetian tasks (e.g., Dasen, 1984; Kagan et al., 1979; Orbell, 1981) . Other samples included variables that were created specifically for the examinees' culture (e.g., Mahmood, 2013; Stemler et al., 2009; Sternberg et al., 2001; van den Briel et al., 2000) or tasks that did not resemble Western intelligence test subtests (Bangirana et al., 2015; Berry et al., 1986; Gauvain & Munroe, 2009 ). There were also several samples that included measures of academic achievement in their data sets (e.g., Bulatao & Reyes-Juan, 1968; Guthrie, 1963; Irvine, 1964) . The fact that g emerged from such a diverse array of measurements supports Spearman's (1927) belief in the "indifference of the indicator" and shows that any cognitive task will correlate with g to some degree.
Other readers may object to our use of EFA at all, arguing that a truly strong test of g theory would be to create a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model in which all scores load onto a general factor. However, we considered and rejected this approach because CFA only tests the model(s) at hand and cannot generate new models from a dataset (Thompson, 2004) . In this study, EFA procedures did not "know" that we were adherents to g theory when producing the results. Rather, "EFA methods . . . are designed to 'let the data speak for themselves,' that is, to let the structure of the data suggest the most probable factor-analytic model" (Carroll, 1993, p. 82) . Thus, if a multifactor model of cognitive abilities were more probable in a dataset than a single g factor, then EFA would be more likely to identify it than a CFA would. The fact that these EFAs so consistently produced g in their data is actually a stronger test of g than a set of CFAs would have been because EFA was more likely to produce a model that disproved g than a CFA would. CFA is also problematic in requiring the analyst to generate a plausible statistical model-a fact that Carroll (1993, p. 82 ) recognized when he wrote:
It might be argued that I should have used CFA. . . . But in view of wide variability in the quality of the analyses applied in published studies, I could not be certain about what kind of hypotheses ought to be tested on this basis. (Carroll, 1993, p. 82) We agree with Carroll on this point. CFA also requires exactly specifying the appropriate model(s) to be tested. While this is a positive aspect of CFA in most situations, it was a distinct disadvantage when we were merely trying to establish whether g was present in a dataset that may not have been collected for that purpose. This is because most authors usually did not report a plausible theoretical model for the structure of their observed variables, and there was often insufficient information for us to create our own plausible non-g models that could be compared with a theory of the existence of Spearman's g in the data.
3 Indeed, some researchers did not collect their data with any model of intelligence in mind at all (e.g., McCoy et al., 2017) . By having EFA to generate a model for us, we allowed plausible competing models to emerge from each dataset and examined them afterward to see if they supported our theory of the existence of Spearman's g in non-Western cultures. Another problem with CFA's requirement of prespecified models is that some theories of cognitive abilities include g as part of a larger theoretical structure of human cognition (e.g., Canivez, 2016; Carroll, 1993) . How the non-g parts of a model might relate to g and to the observed variables is rarely clear.
Another advantage to EFA over CFA is that the former uses data to generate a new model atheoretically, and the subjective decisions (e.g., factor rotation method, second-order procedures, standards used to judge the number of factors) in an EFA are easily preregistered, whereas the subjective decisions in a CFA (e.g., when to use modification indices, how to arrange variables into factors, the number of non-g factors to include in a model) often cannot be realistically preregistered-or even anticipated before knowing which variables were collected-in secondary data analysis if the data were not collected in a theoretically coherent fashion (as was often the case for our data sets). By preregistering the subjective decisions in an EFA, we could ensure that subjective decisions could not bias our results into supporting our preferred view of cognitive abilities.
Finally, we want to remind readers that our dataset search and analysis procedures were preregistered and time stamped at the very beginning of the study before we engaged in any search procedures or analyses. This greatly reduces the chance for us to reverse engineer our methods to ensure that they would produce the results we wanted to obtain. Still, deviations from our preregistration occurred. When we deviated from the preregistration protocol, we stated so explicitly in this article, along with our justification for the deviation. Additionally, some unforeseen circumstances presented themselves as we conducted this study. When these circumstances required subjective decisions after we had found the data, we erred on the side of decisions that would maximize the chances that the study would be a strong test of g theory. Again, we have been transparent about all of these unforeseen circumstances and the decisions we made in response to them.
Limitations
Readers should be aware of limitations in our study. The first important limitation is the difficulty in finding data sets from many countries on the list in Table 1 . This happened for a variety of reasons. For example, we were limited to studies published in English and Spanish (the languages that we are fluent in), but we also found promising references to works in Arabic, French, and Chinese that could possibly contain relevant data. Another hurdle was the lack of published correlation matrices in many reports and 3 A typical example is the Bau and Dyck (1992) study, the researchers collected nine variables that were a mix of academic achievement; verbal, mathematical, and general reasoning; and speed and accuracy tasks. Beyond reporting a correlation matrix, the authors never specified the relationships of these variables to one another. How these nine variables could group into multiple factors is not at all clear, and any model we could create would be arbitrary. It is also not clear a priori whether variable error terms need to be correlated because of shared method or some subtests being administered in an examinee's non-native language (in this case, English). Thus, the characteristics of a plausible CFA model are uncertain, and creating such a model is fraught with many more subjective decisions than in an EFA. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
the reluctance of some authors-including some of the most prominent scholars in the areas of international cognitive and educational assessment-to share their data with us. Finally, many relevant data sets were published in sources that are not indexed by traditional databases. Google Scholar was an effective method of finding data sets that were published in regional or national journals, book chapters, predatory journals, and dissertations. But there are likely many more data sets that we were unable to find because no database index is comprehensive.
Another limitation is that we did not include studies of individuals from the countries in Table 1 who had immigrated to other nations or the children of such immigrants (e.g., Lynn & Owen, 1994) . Such studies could provide useful information, but we eliminated them a priori from our research because we worried that the acculturation process could have made g develop in cognitive data from these individuals. Another potentially interesting population to study could be indigenous groups within countries that are not in Table 1 , such as South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, or China. Each of these countries is not classified by the United Nations as a least developed country or a low middle income nation, but rural areas of these nations may have populations that have experienced few of the cultural or economic influences of Westernization. Also, individuals from the nations of the Arab world (where economic prosperity derived from petroleum deposits) and the Caribbean (where strong tourism-based economies disqualified many countries from our study) may be valuable to investigate.
Although we believe that this study establishes the presence of g in data from these non-Western cultures, this study says nothing about the relative level of general cognitive ability in various societies, nor can it be used to make cross-cultural comparisons. For this purpose, one must establish measurement invariance of a test across different cultural groups (e.g., Holding et al., 2018) to ensure that test items and tasks function in a similar way for each group. The existence of g in all of these cultures shows that-contrary to the opinions of cultural relativists (e.g., Berry, 1986 )-such comparisons may be possible, though the practical hurdles to creating tests for dissimilar cultures show that establishing measurement invariance across groups may be very difficult to overcome (Church & Katigbak, 1987) . Even popular tests that are supposedly usable in many cultures-such as the drawa-person test or the Raven's matrices-sometimes function poorly when administered to non-Western examinees (Dutton et al., 2018; Kathuria & Serpell, 1998; Wicherts et al., 2010a) , and considerable work may be necessary to measure the cultural manifestations and indicators of general cognitive ability in some groups. Investigators who wish to make cross-cultural comparisons must demonstrate that (a) their tests are appropriate for examinees' cultures, (b) examinees understand the instructions and how to respond to test items, and (c) the tests demonstrate measurement invariance across groups. None of these requirements can be assumed without evidence.
We also want to make it clear that even though g likely exists in many human populations, this study does not say how g relates to other cognitive abilities or whether the structure of abilities is the same across cultures. An investigation using multigroup confirmatory factor analysis of the same variables would be capable of determining whether the relationships among g, non-g abilities, and observed variables is the same across cultural groups.
A final limitation of our work is that there is no guarantee that the g found in one sample is the same as the g in another sample. Research on Western samples have shown that the g factors extracted from different intelligence test batteries are highly correlated (r Ն .95), indicating that in these groups, the g factor is the functionally equivalent from test to test (Floyd, Reynolds, Farmer, & Kranzler, 2013; Johnson, Bouchard, Krueger, McGue, & Gottesman, 2004; Johnson, te Nijenhuis, & Bouchard, 2008; Keith, Kranzler, & Flanagan, 2001; Stauffer, Ree, & Carretta, 1996) . It is unknown whether functionally equivalent g factors would appear in non-Western samples, though given that our results align so well with the findings from Western samples it seems plausible that many of these g factors could be similar.
Conclusion
Whether "intelligence" exists across cultures or whether the term has the same meaning across cultures is unknowable and probably irrelevant. The term is culturally loaded and will often have a somewhat altered meaning when translated into other languages. However, the statistical abstraction of Spearman's g is apparent across cultural groups in 31 non-Western, nonindustrialized nations. These results had a remarkable degree of uniformity when data sets were subjected to EFA when using the modern methods of factor selection and rotation. The resulting g factor explained an average of 45.9% observed variable variance, which is about the same percentage found in Western samples.
With approximately half of variance in cognitive task performance having non-g sources of variance, we believe that other traits may be important in explaining cognitive performance of both non-Western and Western groups. There is likely a great deal of cross-cultural variability in the level of importance of non-g traits, possibly because of environmental differences or because of the varying emphasis that different cultures put on developing some cognitive traits (Berry, 1966 (Berry, , 1986 . We believe that culturally sensitive assessment and education that take into account these varying non-g abilities would be beneficial to individuals from many different cultures (Serpell, 2011) . This does not change the fact, though, that general cognitive ability is a dominant trait in the cognition of the non-Western groups we investigated and that it is likely a universal human trait.
